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Abstract 
 
Political Quid Pro Quo and the Impact of Perceptions of Corruption  
On Democratic Behavior 
 
Kristin Joyce Kelly, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2012 
 
Supervisor:  Brian E. Roberts 
 
Since its ruling in Buckley v. Valeo, the U.S. Supreme Court has expressed concern 
regarding corruption or the appearance of corruption stemming from political quid pro 
quo arrangements and the deleterious consequences it may have on citizens’ democratic 
behavior. However, no standard has been set as to what constitutes “the appearance of 
corruption,” as the Court was and continues to be vague in its definition. As a result, 
campaign finance cases after Buckley have relied on public opinion polls as evidence of 
perceptions of corruption, and these polls indicate that the public generally perceives high 
levels of corruption in government. The present study investigates the actual impact that 
perceptions of corruption have on individuals’ levels of political participation. Adapting 
the standard socioeconomic status model developed most fully by Verba and Nie (1972), 
an extended beta-binomial regression estimated using maximum likelihood is performed, 
utilizing unique data from the 2009 University of Texas’ Money and Politics survey. The 
results of this study indicate that individuals who perceive higher levels of quid pro quo 
corruption participate more in politics, on average, than those who perceive lower levels 
of corruption. This suggests that at least part of the Supreme Court’s rationale for 
upholding the FECA contribution limits in Buckley v. Valeo was unfounded. A similar 
test was performed using questions from the 2008 American National Election Study that 
have been used as proxies for corruption in previous studies, with inconclusive results. 
The more precise measure in the Money and Politics survey relates directly to the role of 
money in politics and provides better information than the ANES proxies have in the 
past, as those have been found to be related to factors other than money in politics.  
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 1 
Introduction 
Since the turn of the 20
th
 century, federal campaign finance laws have been 
enacted to prevent the aberration of electoral politics due to the excessive power and 
influence donors gain through large campaign contributions to political candidates.  The 
targets of these campaign finance laws are wide-ranging, including corporations, labor 
unions, interest groups, legislators, and even individuals. After the passage of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act and its amendments in the 1970s, and the Supreme Court 
decision in Buckley v. Valeo in 1976, the Court has demonstrated a concern for corruption 
stemming from political quid pro quo arrangements. While the Court argued that the 
bribery-like behavior present in quid pro quo transactions is worrisome due to the 
corruption of legislators, it also introduced a second argument that simply the appearance 
of corruption is troubling for democracy and the political process. The Court’s rationale 
for avoiding even the appearance of corruption is based on the fear that the integrity of 
our democratic political system will be undermined if the public perceives an individual, 
a corporation, or special interests gain political favor from giving large campaign 
contributions to those running for public office (Buckley v. Valeo 1976). Thus, the 
Court’s logic for upholding the FECA contribution limits, while striking down the 
expenditure limits as an unconstitutional breach of First Amendment free speech rights, 
was a narrowly-constructed corruption-prevention rationale. In the eyes of the Court, 
campaign contributions and political quid pro quo come closest to the idea of corruption 
one can find in the political arena today.  
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However, the Court makes many speculative linkages when it presumes campaign 
finance regulation mitigates the threat corruption or its appearance poses to our 
democratic society. More serious is the assumption that perceptions of corruption 
undermine citizens’ confidence in our government’s integrity, leading to lower citizen 
participation. This idea was first introduced in the Court’s opinion in Buckley, and made 
even more explicit in the opinion of Justice David Souter in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri 
Government PAC, et al. (2000). When discussing perceptions of corruption, he wrote: 
The public interest in countering that perception was, indeed, the entire answer to 
the overbreadth claim raised in the Buckley case. Id., at 30. This made perfect 
sense. Leave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the cynical 
assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of 
voters to take part in democratic governance (528 U.S. 377, at 390). 
 
Such language suggests that the Court recognizes a direct relationship between 
perceptions of corruption and citizens’ participation in democratic behavior, and it is this 
relationship that is the focus of this study. 
Since Buckley, campaign finance scholars have focused much of their attention on 
studies using data from the Federal Election Commission, but only a handful have 
investigated the effects of political money or campaign finance reforms on public 
attitudes. The few studies that comprise the latter group have looked at the connection 
between campaign spending and citizens’ attitudes towards government, particularly trust 
and efficacy, or at how campaign finance laws affect citizens’ perceptions of corruption 
or their attitudes towards government (Coleman and Manna 2000; Persily and Lammie 
2004; Primo 2002; Primo and Milyo 2006).  
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An area of study even more undertilled is the link between perceptions of 
corruption and actual political participation as suggested by Shrink. Little is known as to 
whether the Supreme Court’s rationale for upholding campaign contribution limits is 
valid—whether perceptions of corruption stemming from political quid pro quo 
negatively affect an individual citizen’s democratic behavior1. It is this relationship that I 
investigate in this study. If a democracy is truly “rule by the people”, then citizens’ 
participation in electoral politics is crucial for the health of our democracy. When only a 
few citizens participate, democracy suffers; conversely, greater citizen participation in the 
political decision-making process is reflective of a healthier democratic system.  
 Implied by the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley is the idea that campaign 
finance reforms reduce opportunities for actual corruption or mitigate perceptions of 
corruption in the political process. By lowering the appearance of corruption, the Court 
hopes to avoid the negative effects to democracy that come with the loss of trust and 
efficacy, and thus avoid political disengagement by the public. However, one must 
question whether the Court’s fears have a factual underpinning, as there is no evidence to 
suggest this assumption is true. In fact, recent political events suggest that perceptions of 
corruption may in fact promote and enhance democratic behavior. The Occupy Wall 
Street movement in 2011, along with other Occupy movements around the world, was 
sparked by public perceptions of corporate corruption and greed overwhelming the 
democratic process. In short, perceptions of corruption stimulated political participation, 
                                                 
1 Welch and Hibbing (1997) look at the relationship between corruption and vote choice in Congressional 
elections, and find that campaign violations do not have a statistically significant impact on vote choice. A 
study performed by Peters and Welch (1980) investigates the impact of charges of corruption on net turnout 
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as people actively took part in protests and rallies to signal their discontent with the status 
quo.  
Given the Court’s concern with the appearance of corruption, I seek to determine 
whether greater perceptions of corruption actually lead to lower levels of participation 
among individuals. In this study, I provide an analysis of this question by modifying the 
standard socioeconomic model of participation and applying it to data from a special 
survey conducted by researchers at the University of Texas in 2009. For the purposes of 
analysis, I presume that lower perceptions of corruption are desirable for democratic 
participation and seek to ascertain whether higher perceived levels of corruption 
negatively affect democratic behavior. Similar models are run using questions from the 
2008 American National Election Study, using proxies for corruption that have been 
employed in previous studies. I expect that the measure for the appearance of corruption 
used in the Money and Politics survey, which more precisely links to the role of money in 
politics, provides greater purchase and better information than proxies for corruption 
have in previous studies, as those have been found to be related to factors other than 
money in politics. 
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Buckley v. Valeo and Corruption 
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and its 1974 amendments were the 
first comprehensive set of campaign finance regulations enacted by Congress. The 1974 
amendments created the Federal Election Commission, which was designed to administer 
and enforce election laws. The amendments also set contribution and expenditure limits 
on unions, corporations, and individuals, and created tighter disclosure rules. 
In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Supreme Court ruled that the expenditure limits 
set by the FECA were unconstitutional since they impinge upon a citizen’s rights to free 
speech as determined by the First Amendment.  The Court justified its decision because 
money, while it does not equal speech, is necessary for engaging in political speech in a 
meaningful way since virtually any political communication requires money to be spent 
in order for campaign messages to reach the political marketplace.  However, the 
decision in Buckley upheld the contribution limits outlined in the FECA, citing a 
compelling government interest in preventing “corruption and the appearance of 
corruption, spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial 
contributions on candidates’ positions and on their actions if elected to office” (Buckley v. 
Valeo 1976, 27). The integrity of our democratic political system, in the Courts’ eye, is 
undermined when large contributions are quid pro quo exchanged for political favor 
because the appearance of improper influence by contributors on policymakers’ decisions 
may erode confidence in our system of representative government (Buckley v. Valeo 
1976).  
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The concept of quid pro quo was the definition of corruption set in Buckley (and 
reaffirmed in Citizens’ United v. FEC in 2010), vaguely defined as the undue influence 
on officeholders or candidates stemming from large political contributions. In other 
words, the standard way to determine whether corruption occurs is when a legislator 
strays from her constituents’ interests when making a political decision where, absent the 
money of a contributor or set of contributors, she would have voted or acted in some 
other manner. So the Supreme Court was particularly concerned about the corruption of 
the political process, with corruption being something akin to bribery. But because 
bribery laws already existed for members of Congress, the Court’s opinion left corruption 
ambiguously defined as quid pro quo plus something that differentiates it from bribery.  
The definition of corruption accepted by the Court has vacillated in various cases 
over the years, but most often refers to the “undue influence” gained on the part of 
campaign contributors on an elected officeholder’s judgment (FEC v Colorado 
Republican Federal Campaign Commission 2001, at 44). However, the Court has also 
described corruption as a subversion of the political process, where officeholders are 
influenced to act in a manner contrary to the interests of their constituents in exchange for 
financial gain for themselves or their campaigns. Court decisions after Buckley regarding 
campaign finance such as Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990) and 
McConnell v. FEC (2003) expanded the definition of corruption in terms of the distorting 
effects that large aggregations of wealth have on the electoral process, and set limits on 
corporate expenditures and soft money based on this definition.  However, the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Citizens United (2010) invalidated the antidistortion definition of 
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corruption for campaign finance regulation, returning to the original Buckley definition 
regarding quid pro quo exchanges as the only working definition of corruption to be used 
as the basis for any future campaign finance laws. Yet at no point did the Court have 
evidence that there was, in fact, any actual corruption occurring.  In fact, Bradley Smith, 
a noted authority on campaign finance and former member of the FEC, concludes that 
“The idea that serious quid pro quo corruption exists is simply not supported by the 
empirical evidence available” (Smith 2001, 135).  
Furthermore, the Court determined that simply the appearance of corruption is 
worrisome, citing that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence is necessary 
to prevent the confidence in our system of representative government to be eroded to a 
“disastrous extent” (Buckley v. Valeo 1976, at 28). As a result, the Court ruled that 
campaign finance laws regarding contribution limits, with the intent of mitigating real or 
perceived corruption, will be upheld even if they violate First Amendment rights. From 
the language in Buckley, it becomes clear that maintaining the “integrity of our 
democratic political system” should be, in the eyes of the Supreme Court, the primary 
goal of campaign finance reform.  
Advocates for campaign finance reform have used anecdotal quotes from 
legislators and public opinion polls as evidence that Americans perceive corruption in 
electoral politics. Perhaps it is due to the lack of empirical evidence of actual corruption, 
or the lack of a standard set for determining the appearance of corruption, that the Court 
allows public opinion regarding the appearance of corruption to stand as the basis for 
their campaign finance decisions. It is, after all, public perceptions of corruption that the 
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Court fears will undermine democratic behavior. However, use of such public opinion 
polls is problematic because while the public perceives high levels of corruption in 
government,  these perceptions of corruption have been found to be largely unrelated to 
the campaign finance system (Persily and Lammie 2004).  
Additionally, Persily and Lammie note that while constitutional law hinges on 
public opinion, public opinion does not need to be informed to perceive corruption. For 
example, the public’s perceptions of corporate money in elections has been found to be 
greatly influenced by the media, who in the past have focused excessively on corporate 
contributions rather than on contributions from individuals (which are the largest source 
of campaign contributions), when corporate PAC contributions prior to Citizens’ United 
v. FEC (2010) were neither an important nor a growing source of campaign funds for 
federal candidates (Ansolabehere, Snowberg, and Snyder 2005; Milyo, Primo, and 
Groseclose 2000). In essence, public perceptions of the role of corporate money in 
elections are rather distorted. 
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Campaign Finance and Public Opinion 
 According to a number of public opinion polls, the American public believes that 
political contributors exert undue influence over the policy choices of elected officials. 
The findings in these polls have been used as evidence in court by campaign finance 
advocates to support reform efforts (Persily and Lammie 2004; Primo 2002). Figure 1 
demonstrates that approximately 80 percent of survey respondents believe that corruption 
in the U.S. Congress is a serious problem. Similarly, sixty-eight percent of those 
surveyed believe that politicians regularly base their votes on a legislative bill on the 
preferences of their campaign contributors rather than those of their constituents (Figure 
2).  
Findings such as these have prompted researchers to study the connection between 
campaign spending and public opinion. Reform advocates make the claim that cleaning 
up the system will restore the public’s faith in government, linking public cynicism to 
campaign finance. Examining the connection between attitudes such as trust in 
government and campaign spending, Primo (2002) suggests that we ought to see less 
spending and greater trust in government after campaign finance reforms are passed if 
this link exists, but finds no evidence to indicate that this relationship holds. However, his 
study actually investigated the relationship between trust and spending, not regulation 
and trust, and did not actually test whether campaign finance reforms lower the 
appearance of corruption. 
Other studies find that campaign finance reforms do not have a large positive 
effect on attitudes of trust and efficacy, which one might expect given the Court’s 
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Figure 1: Public Perceptions of Corruption In Congress 
 
Source: University of Texas' Money and Politics Survey 2009 
Figure 2: Perceptions of Frequency of Corruption In Congress 
 
Source: University of Texas' Money and Politics Survey 2009  
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corruption-prevention rationale, and suggest that an individual’s perception of corruption 
depends upon a number of factors unrelated to money in politics (Persily and Lammie 
2004; Primo and Milyo 2006). This highlights a potential problem with the Court’s logic 
regarding the constitutionality of FECA’s campaign contribution limits in Buckley v. 
Valeo, and rulings on subsequent campaign finance-related cases have been based on 
evidence from public opinion polls regarding the public’s perceptions of corruption. 
Campaign finance advocates claim that cleaning up our democratic political 
system will restore the public’s faith in government. However, perceptions of corruption 
and individuals’ feelings of efficacy may have more to do with individual-level traits and 
the state of the national economy and less to do with the role of money in campaigns 
(Persily and Lammie 2004).  Furthermore, campaign finance regulations should be 
expected to assuage the appearance of corruption, as has been their intent since Buckley; 
instead, researchers have determined that campaign finance regulations (with the 
exception of disclosure requirements) have neither increased public trust in government 
nor positively affected people’s feelings of efficacy, which are presumably linked with 
perceptions of corruption (Primo 2002; Primo and Milyo 2006). Thus, contribution 
regulations have not been effective in curtailing public perceptions of corruption, 
regardless of whether or not corruption is actually occurring. 
One study finds that campaign spending contributes to the quality of democracy 
by increasing public knowledge of candidates and their ideologies, increasing the 
competitiveness of elections (Coleman and Manna 2002). However, this same study finds 
that campaign spending does not have a substantive impact on attitudes such as trust in 
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government and feelings of efficacy, suggesting that campaign spending is not what 
causes public disaffection and withdrawal from politics. However, if perceptions of 
corruption stemming from the role of money in campaigns do have a negative impact on 
political behavior and participation, then the Court would be justified in their 
determination that large contributions promote the appearance of corruption and thus 
undermine American democracy.  
What is important for the present study is whether perceptions of corruption 
undermine the public’s faith in the democratic process, and whether this is reflected in 
citizens’ democratic behavior. Therefore, I examine the connection between citizens’ 
perceptions of corruption in their government and their levels of political participation. If 
the Court’s rationale underlying their decision in Buckley is sound, then those who 
perceive higher levels of quid pro quo corruption in government should participate at 
lower levels than the rest of the public. While the Court may not have discarded the 
argument that corruption might incite participation, their decision to uphold contribution 
limits suggests that the negative effects of the appearance of corruption on democratic 
behavior outweighed the possible positive effects. However, as demonstrated by the 
Occupy Wall Street movement, perceptions of corruption may actually stimulate 
participation and democratic behavior. This indicates a potential problem with the 
Court’s logic, and their decision in Buckley has had wide-reaching consequences in 
shaping campaign finance regulation for the past thirty-five years. If the Court’s 
corruption-prevention rationale is faulty, then perhaps the perceptions of corruption 
associated with large campaign contributions from wealthy individuals, interest groups, 
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and corporations are a boon for democracy as people take to action to get their voices 
heard. 
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The Socioeconomic Model of Participation 
Political participation refers to those activities undertaken by citizens that attempt 
to influence the structure of government, the selection of governmental personnel, and/or 
the policies of government (Conway 1985).  The most common form of citizen 
participation is voting, but there are many other activities an individual can engage in 
beyond voting including making campaign contributions, participating in rallies or 
protests, and contacting one’s elected representative through a letter or phone call. 
Participation is at the heart of democracy in the United States, as traditional democratic 
theory assumes that citizens are interested in and participate in politics because 
participation is an instrumental act through which their needs and desires are 
communicated to and influence the government. One can assume that the more an 
individual citizen participates, the more likely that individual is to affect the behavior of 
the government. 
A fact well-established in the literature on political participation is that citizens of 
higher social and economic status (SES) generally participate in politics at higher rates 
than those with lower socioeconomic status (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and 
Nie 1972). Individuals with higher socioeconomic status have the time, money, and 
knowledge that enable them to participate in politics, and these individuals usually reside 
in social environments which encourage and reinforce positive participatory norms 
(Leighley 1995).  As such, individuals with higher SES more often possess the 
psychological characteristics that contribute to greater participation, such as a greater 
concern with political issues and a higher feeling of efficacy, than those with lower SES. 
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However, scholars note that political participation in general has declined since the 
1960s, despite rising education levels in the public (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Niemi 
and Weisberg 2001). It is possible that higher perceptions of corruption in the public are 
contributing to this decline in participation, as I will investigate further in this study. 
According to the standard socioeconomic model of participation developed by 
Verba and Nie (1972), the social status of an individual largely determines whether he or 
she will participate in politics, mediated by the intervening effects of civic attitudes such 
as a sense of efficacy and a psychological involvement in politics.  As such, education 
and income are widely known to be the two best predictors of political participation 
(Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1972). Psychological involvement refers to 
the complex structure of attitudes and beliefs a person holds with respect to politics, 
including a general interest in politics and/or identification with a political party (Conway 
1985). Other individual characteristics that are known to modify the workings of the 
standard SES model and its baseline expectations include age, race, and ethnicity, so I 
adapt the traditional SES model to include these characteristics. In sum, then, my model 
suggests that an individual’s level of participation is primarily a function of education 
and income, slightly altered by other demographic factors, and mediated by an 
individual’s sense of efficacy and interest in politics. If the Court’s logic rings true, then 
one would predict that those who view higher levels of corruption in government would 
be less likely to participate in that system due to cynicism and lower feelings of efficacy. 
  
 16 
Data and Design 
The modified SES model will be tested using data from a national survey of 
public attitudes conducted with funds from the Texas Politics project at the University of 
Texas at Austin and the Center for Politics and Governance. The survey was conducted 
by YouGov/Polimetrix, which administered an internet-based survey of the adult 
population using a “matching” technique. YouGov first drew probability samples from 
the population of all adult Americans through a random-digit dialing technique, and then 
interviewed individuals from within their online pool who matched the original 
individuals on a number of dimensions including age, education, geographic location, 
gender, party identification, and race/ethnicity.  This generated a representative sample of 
the population consisting of 2100 adult citizens who were asked to complete a survey of 
110 questions, fielded over the internet.  The margin of error for the survey, fielded 
October 13 to 22, 2009, was +/- 2.1 percentage points with a response rate of 86%. 
(Appendix A)  
An event count analysis is applicable when the dependent variable of a regression 
model is an index variable, constructed as a sum of binary survey items.  Because survey 
items are finite, discrete, and non-negative, an extended beta-binomial (EBB) regression 
model estimated through maximum likelihood estimation is appropriate to use. 
Underlying the extended beta-binomial regression is the assumption that respondents 
sharing the same attributes do not have the same probability of participating in politics 
(Lin, Helfer, and Morgan 2011). The EBB regression model weakens the binomial 
assumption that π, the probability of participating in a certain political act, is constant 
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among individuals and instead assumes that individual probabilities (πi) differ among 
individuals with the same attributes because of random selection and stochastic variation. 
These average probabilities are assumed to follow a beta distribution since the beta 
distribution is continuous and restricted between 0 and 1. Reparameterizing π as a 
random variable following the beta distribution with parameters ρ and γ, and taking the 
product of the binomial and beta distributions, results in the beta-binomial mixed 
distribution. Collapsing this joint distribution over π and then substituting each 
occurrence of ρ with π results in the extended-beta binomial model (See Appendix B for 
an exposition of the extended beta-binomial model).  
Thus, πi varies among individuals with similar characteristics, allowing for 
heteroskedastic variation in the probability that an individual responds affirmatively to a 
set of questions regarding his or her political activities. The dispersion parameter γ 
governs the degree to which πi varies among individuals. However, in order for this 
model to be appropriate, one must assume that the binary responses to the survey items 
are independently distributed Bernoulli random variables and that the probability πi of 
participating in a political activity is identical for each activity (and thus the probability 
of answering yes to each participation question is identical) for each individual.   
Using the individual as my unit of analysis, the dependent variable in this study is 
an index variable for political participation created from ten participation items inquiring 
whether a respondent had engaged in a certain political action within the past four years2 
(See Appendix C for question wording). These participatory acts include making a 
                                                 
2 Coded 1= participated in that action, 0= did not participate in that form 
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campaign contribution, attending a political meeting or rally, discussing politics with 
friends and family, contacting an elected representative, contacting a newspaper or 
magazine for political causes, petitioning, voting in a primary election, volunteering for a 
campaign, or participating in some other way. While these participatory acts vary in 
terms of their difficulty, what matters for the purposes of this study is the total amount of 
participation engaged in by an individual and not the type of act in which she engages as 
these questions regarding activity serve as indicators of an individual’s underlying 
propensity to participate in politics. 
Figure 3: Distribution of Political Participation 
 
A histogram of the dependent variable shows that more than three-quarters of the 
population participates in politics in some form (Figure 3). The average number of 
political activities the public reports having been engaged in is 2.84, where the most  
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Table 1: Participation Activities 
% respondents 
engaging in activity 
Discuss politics with friends and family 65 
Vote in a primary 63 
Contact elected representative 40 
Signed a petition 29 
Made a campaign contribution 27 
Attend a political meeting or rally 22 
Contact newspapers or magazines editors for political causes 12 
Took part in a political protest 12 
Volunteered for a political campaign 12 
Participated in some other way 2 
Source: University of Texas' Money and Politics Survey 2009 
 
 
 
 
common form of participation is discussing politics with friends and family followed 
closely by voting in a primary (Table 1).3 Volunteering for a campaign, contacting the 
media for political purposes, taking part in a protest, and participating in some other form 
round out the least common forms of participation. 4 
Because of their noted relationship to political participation, two independent 
variables in this model are education and income. Higher education levels are associated 
with the kinds of cognitive skills that facilitate political activity, as the better-educated 
generally know more about the workings of the political system, and are more aware of 
how the consequences of government action will affect their lives (Conway 1985).  They 
are more easily able to find information necessary for participation such as who their 
                                                 
3 Self-reports of turnout are notoriously high, so this estimate may be exaggerated. 
4 Most respondents who participated in some other form were involved in some type of paid campaign 
work, including campaign management. 
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elected officials are or where to go for a political meeting, and usually have more time to 
devote to politics. Poorer citizens, however, must spend more of their attention on 
obtaining the necessities of life and therefore have less free time to dedicate to politics.  
One psychological involvement variable included in this model is political 
interest, or the extent to which an individual expresses interest in and is attentive to 
political matters. Obviously, individuals with low interest in politics are not as likely to 
participate in politics as those who are highly-interested. Other psychological 
involvement variables I include in this study relate to partisanship and ideology. Partisan 
affiliation is an indication of the degree to which an individual identifies himself with one 
of the two parties.  More important to this study, however, is strength of partisanship, as 
those with stronger attachments to their parties are presumed to participate more since the 
strongly committed may derive greater personal satisfaction from participating 
(Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Because of this, I folded the traditional 7-point partisan 
identification scale into a 3-part partisan strength variable comprised of strong partisans, 
weak partisans, and nonpartisans to determine whether strength of partisanship has an 
independent effect on participation5. For similar reasons, I include strength of ideology as 
a control variable as well, with the expectation that those who have stronger ideological 
leanings will also be more likely to participate.  
Dummy variables for race and ethnicity are included in the model. Historically, 
blacks and Latinos have been found to participate less in activities other than voting due 
                                                 
5 Keith, et al. (1992) find that Independent leaners display a tendency to vote for the candidate of the party 
they feel closer to, and in many cases are more loyal to their party than weak partisans. As such, I recoded 
Independent leaners as weak partisans. 
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to a variety of factors including lower levels of education and lower-income employment 
(Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). In addition, Latinos may participate less than blacks or 
whites due to a language barrier (Conway 1985). Age is important to control for as well, 
as participation rates among the young are generally low and rise as an individual ages, 
and then drop off again with old age (Jennings and Markus 1988). This is due to the fact 
that as one ages, he or she presumably gains more experience, becomes familiar with the 
political process, and acquires the political knowledge and skills that foster participation. 
My key independent variable of interest in this model is perceptions of corruption. 
The advantage of using the 2009 Money and Politics survey is that it includes a question 
that asks the respondent how often he or she thinks politicians base their votes on a 
legislative bill on the preferences of their campaign contributors rather than their 
constituents (see Appendix D). In other words, the question asks how often the individual 
perceives corruption stemming from political quid pro quo—precisely the type of 
corruption the Supreme Court has been concerned with since Buckley. I use these 
perceptions of corruption as a proxy for external efficacy, as the two are presumed to be 
linked (Primo 2002; Primo and Milyo 2006). As such, the most efficacious citizens are 
more likely to try to influence politics and political decisions than the least efficacious, as 
efficacy fosters political involvement. If one does not believe that his actions make a 
difference to political outcomes, then participation is a waste of time (Rosenstone and 
Hansen 1993). Citizens expect to gain benefits if they think the government is responsive 
to their demands, but those who think political leaders cannot or refuse to respond to their 
demands may not see a reason in voting or otherwise participating in the democratic 
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process. Based on these assumptions, I expect that, if perceptions of corruption affect 
political behavior and participation, those who perceive higher levels of corruption in 
government (and thus have lower feelings of efficacy) will exhibit lower levels of 
political participation. Such a finding would be evidence that the Court’s fear of 
corruption undermining the democratic process is grounded in reality. 
Three other models were run using questions from the 2008 American National 
Election Study that were as close to the idea of corruption as could be found in existing 
survey data. Previous studies of attitudes regard corruption in the United States have used 
some of these questions, which tap a more general idea of corruption and not the more 
specific type of corruption stemming from money in the political process. These three 
proxies for corruption include whether one trusts the government to do what is right, 
whether government wastes tax money, and whether those who run the government are 
crooked (see Appendix E). The dependent variable in these models is an index of 
political participation created from seven participation items in the ANES including 
making a campaign contribution, discussing politics with friends and family, attending a 
rally, wearing a campaign button or putting up a yard sign, voting in a primary, 
contacting one’s representative, or volunteering for a campaign.6 As stated earlier, the 
Money and Politics corruption question is presumed to be a more precise measure of 
                                                 
6 It must be noted that the time intervals for the participation questions differed for the Money and Politics 
survey and the 2008 ANES. The time intervals for the Money and Politics Survey generally extended back 
four years, while the 2008 ANES asked about the most recent election cycle. However, given that 2008 was 
a high-involvement presidential election year and the survey was administered during a period when 
Americans were most likely to vote and participate in other ways anyway, the results were likely not 
affected by question wording. 
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corruption than these ANES proxies, in the sense that it is more closely linked to the 
notion of money in politics. 
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Results 
Table 2: Determinants of Political Participation 
 Money and 
Politics 
  ANES  
Independent Variables Quid Pro Quo Model  Trust Model Waste Model Crooked Model 
Education 
.103*** 
(.015) 
 .141*** 
(.014) 
.142*** 
(.014) 
.141*** 
(.014) 
Income 
.047*** 
(.01) 
 .024** 
(.009) 
.023** 
(.009) 
.025** 
(.009) 
Interest 
.413*** 
(.023) 
 .235*** 
(.016) 
.234*** 
(.016) 
.235*** 
(.016) 
Age 
.027** 
(.01) 
 .013 
(.008) 
.012 
(.008) 
.012 
(.008) 
Black 
-.093 
(.051) 
 .104** 
(.034) 
.107** 
(.034) 
.103** 
(.034) 
Latino 
-.144** 
(.05) 
 .007 
(.035) 
.006 
(.035) 
.005 
(.035) 
Partisan Strength 
.064** 
(.023) 
 .192*** 
(.022) 
.194*** 
(.022) 
.194*** 
(.022) 
Ideological 
Strength 
.103*** 
(.021) 
 .05* 
(.022) 
.05* 
(.022) 
.051* 
(.022) 
Corruption 
.06** 
(.021) 
 .03 
(.023) 
.017 
(.027) 
.011 
(.021) 
Intercept 
-2.92*** 
(.112) 
 -2.53*** 
(.105) 
-2.50*** 
(.109) 
-2.48*** 
(.101) 
Gamma 
.095*** 
(.008) 
 .022*** 
(.006) 
.023*** 
(.006) 
.023*** 
(.006) 
N 1450 
 
1821 1819 1809 
Log Likelihood -2850  -2780 -2777 -2763 
Source: Data from the University of Texas' Money and Politics Survey 2009 and ANES 2008. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*p≤.05  **p≤.01  ***p≤.001 
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 Table 2 presents the results for all models. The coefficients of the extended beta-
binomial model are not linear and are therefore difficult to interpret substantively. The 
easiest way to understand their meaning is through example.  Looking first at the 
coefficients for the quid pro quo model, a one-unit increase in education would lead to a 
positive increase in the average probability that an individual responds affirmatively to a 
political participation question.  We talk in terms of averages because of the assumption 
that πi is heteroskedastic due to stochastic variation. As such, π becomes the average of 
all individuals' πi who have the same linear combination of attributes.  Also, the gamma 
coefficient for the quid pro quo model is highly significant, indicating there is a small 
degree of heteroskedasticity of π in the model (and overdispersion is indeed an issue).   
Not surprisingly, both education and income are highly statistically significant 
and in the expected direction.  The dummy variables for Blacks and Latinos are also in 
the expected direction, but only the dummy for Latino reaches statistical significance.  
This suggests that, after controlling for SES, blacks are just as likely to participate as 
whites. However, the probability of participating drops for Latinos, holding all other 
factors constant. 
With regards to the psychological involvement variables, interest in politics is 
also highly statistically significant and in the expected direction.  Individuals who are 
more interested in politics have a higher probability of participating than those who are 
less interested. Stronger partisan ties and ideological leanings also increase an 
individual’s probability of participating in the political process.  Those who more closely 
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identify a political party or who have more clearly delineated issue preferences are more 
likely to be involved in politics than those who have weaker preferences. 
 The most telling result, however, is my measure for corruption. Because 
perceptions of corruption can be considered a proxy for external political efficacy, one 
would expect that those who perceive greater levels of quid pro quo corruption would 
exhibit lower levels of political participation given the Court’s rationale.  However, the 
corruption variable is statistically significant but runs in the opposite direction of what 
was expected.  Those who perceive higher levels of quid pro quo corruption are actually 
more likely to participate in politics than those who perceive lower levels of corruption.  
While the coefficient seems relatively small in magnitude, its effect on political 
participation is still statistically significant and suggests that perceptions of quid pro quo 
corruption may in fact stimulate political participation. This could be because those who 
are interested in politics and who perceive corruption seek to change the political system 
through their actions.  They may be driven to participate more precisely because they do 
not trust the government to follow the will of the people. In any case, these results 
provide evidence that perceptions of quid pro quo corruption do not have a negative 
effect on political behavior; rather, they may have a positive effect for democracy. These 
findings also indicate that the Supreme Court’s rationale for justifying contribution limits 
in Buckley should be revisited.  
 The ANES data, however, provide rather different results. In all three models, the 
variables for corruption do not reach statistical significance. It could be that there is no 
connection between perceptions of corruption and participation but this is unlikely. 
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Rather, previous studies note that only a small portion of the public who are unhappy 
with the political process claim this dissatisfaction stems from perception that politicians 
are corrupt or that special interests “buy” political outcomes (Primo 2002). Persily and 
Lammie (2004) also use proxies for corruption from the ANES and determine that 
perceptions of these types of corruption stem from a person’s socioeconomic status, 
opinion of the president, opinion regarding the performance of the economy, and 
psychological predispositions rather than anything involving the role of money in 
politics.  
So while the three questions I use from the ANES come close to the idea of 
corruption in government, none of explicitly use the word “corruption” and likely capture 
conceptions of corruption beyond the idea of quid pro quo that are more familiar to the 
public, such as patronage or extortion.  Beliefs about the “crookedness” of elected 
officials may tap ideas regarding the honesty of politicians, whom some believe are prone 
to lies or other scandalous behavior. Distrust in government may expand beyond the idea 
of corruption to include individuals’ doubts as to whether government can solve problems 
or pass policy, particularly at a time when polarization in Congress is high and approval 
of Congress is low. Finally, government waste may tap into an individual’s level of 
conservatism and opinions regarding big government rather than his or her beliefs about 
corruption.  
Thus, what makes the Money and Politics survey so unique and particularly 
insightful is that it directly measures citizens’ perceptions of how often quid pro quo 
occurs. The Money and Politics data provides a more accurate measure of the particular 
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brand of corruption that SCOTUS worries about with regards to campaign finance 
reform. This study demonstrates that the way corruption is measured can have profound 
effects on empirical results, which is concerning due to the Court’s acceptance of public 
opinion polls as evidence in campaign finance cases. 
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Discussion 
One criticism to my findings might be that citizens who participate in politics may 
perceive greater levels of corruption because they are actively involved in and are more 
aware of political happenings. It could be that, rather than perceptions of corruption 
affecting levels of participation, higher levels of participation might induce higher 
perceptions of corruption. This argument has intuitive appeal, considering studies which 
indicate that attentive individuals tend to be more skeptical of campaign finance 
regulations and generally overestimate the amount of money in politics (Ansolabehere, 
Snowberg, and Snyder 2005; Primo 2002). However, a key assumption of the SES model 
posits that attitudes precede behavior—in other words, it assumes that positive civic 
orientations are causally prior to acts of participation (Leighley 1995). Regardless of the 
direction in which the causal arrow points, the relationship between perceptions of 
corruption and political behavior is a positive one, which still works counter to the 
Court’s logic for upholding campaign contribution limits.   
The Court’s decision to uphold campaign contribution limits has done little to 
stem public perceptions of corruption by any measure and, from a normative standpoint, 
may have had the unintended consequence of undermining the integrity of our political 
system even more so than does the appearance of corruption. Instead of preventing 
corruption, campaign contribution limits combined with unlimited expenditures set by the 
FECA have made the campaign finance system less visible. Negative ads and smear 
campaigns, coupled with the loss of candidate accountability due to independent 
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expenditures, may erode public trust when citizens find it difficult to determine which 
campaign messages to believe and have trouble figuring out who is funding them.   
The Supreme Court’s campaign against the appearance of corruption shifted 
money from what were once direct contributions to political campaigns to contributions 
to outside groups like SuperPACS. Yet these contributions to outside groups for 
independent expenditures are still campaign contributions in a sense, and contributing 
groups and individuals may still seek influence with a candidate on a policy. Influence 
stemming from independent expenditures may be worse than influence due to direct 
contributions because of lack of accountability for a message made on behalf of a 
representative, who can (and must) deny responsibility for any negativity due to FEC 
restrictions against coordination with outside groups. 
 The consequences of recent campaign finance reform has resulted in what Kang 
(2010) refers to as “reverse hydraulics”. Issacharoff and Karlan (1988) first proposed that 
political money is “hydraulic” in the sense that when restrictions are placed upon it, the 
result is the displacement of financial contributions towards less-regulated third parties to 
reach the same political ends as before. One of the unintended consequences of the FECA 
was the explosion of independent expenditures made by third parties in political 
campaigns in the form of issue advocacy, allowing these groups to skirt the imposed 
contribution ceilings.7 In reverse hydraulics, the removal of restrictions on independent 
expenditures made by corporations and unions (as per Citizens United) may cause money 
                                                 
7 As opposed to express advocacy. Express advocacy involves the use of certain keywords that call for the 
election or defeat of a political candidate. Issue advocacy refers to communications that avoid these key 
words, but can be interpreted to favor or disfavor a candidate. 
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to flow back to the more direct, previously regulated pathways.  This allows groups like 
SuperPACS to collect corporate and union money for express advocacy in the form of 
independent expenditures to support political candidates.  
According to Kang (2010), after Citizens’ United the definition of corruption has 
been expanded beyond the corruption of legislators to include the political process itself.  
He suggests that instead of trying to restrict money coming into campaigns, we should 
instead attempt to check the influence of money that is already in the system. If FECA’s 
contribution ceilings were removed and unlimited campaign contributions were allowed, 
while retaining or improving compelled disclosure laws, voters could more easily track 
who donated what and how much to a political campaign. Watchdog groups and the 
media would certainly alert the public to very large, questionable contributions and their 
potential influence, allowing an individual to scrutinize a legislator’s actions and hold 
him or her accountable for any perceived impropriety resulting from those contributions.  
Additionally, if these restrictions were lifted, issue advocacy groups would likely 
make the shift back to direct donations rather than continuing along the independent 
expenditure path if they were truly attempting to greater influence policy decisions. The 
results would lead to greater accountability on the part of candidates, increased 
transparency in government, and aid the democratic process. As a result, candidates 
would likely self-regulate their interests with the option of refusing donations or 
accepting only part of a donation, as taking too much money from one or a few interest 
groups and making questionable decisions would likely result in punishment by a 
representative’s constituents in the form of not being re-elected. 
 32 
Conclusion  
This study has sought to shed light on whether the Supreme Court’s fears of 
corruption and the perception of corruption are warranted. As a means of addressing this 
issue, this study has utilized a unique data set that directly measures perceptions of 
political quid pro quo corruption, and revealed the effect these perceptions have on 
individuals’ political participation levels. Concerned with maintaining the integrity of 
democracy, the Court has ruled on the constitutionality of campaign finance laws and 
upheld contribution limits in an effort to reduce the degrading effect that that corruption 
has on our political system.  However, as these results show, perceptions of corruption 
stemming from political quid pro quo do not negatively affect democratic behavior. To 
the contrary, perceptions of corruption appear to stimulate political participation in the 
American public. Because of this, I determine that the Court’s rationale for upholding the 
campaign contribution limits originally established by FECA should be reconsidered. 
My project is a contribution to the body of literature on the campaign finance 
debate. Previous studies consider the impact of perceptions of corruption on the attitudes 
and beliefs of American citizens.  However, because people’s attitudes have been found 
to be inconsistent with the realities of campaign finance, likely due to low levels of 
knowledge regarding the workings of campaign finance laws, the real question is whether 
these perceptions of corruption have a real impact on political behavior. 
From a normative perspective, there has been little academic research suggesting 
how we can effectively increase public knowledge and change public perceptions about 
the role of money in politics. Regulation has had little impact on public perceptions of 
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corruption, so more regulation would not be sufficient. Our best bet for educating the 
public lies in the hands of the media, who appear to play a large role in shaping negative 
public opinion with regards to money in politics due to selective reporting and a penchant 
for the sensational. Given that the media’s job is to sell news, their reporting habits are 
not likely to change, and public ignorance about the role of political money will likely 
continue. But as the results of this study indicate, perceptions of corruption held by the 
public may not be a bad thing for democracy, as they appear to stimulate democratic 
behavior. Paradoxically, public perceptions of corruption may be a boon, rather than a 
bane, for democracy. 
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Appendices 
APPENDIX A: YOUGOV/POLIMETRIX METHODOLOGY  
(Blass, Roberts, and Shaw 2010) 
Survey Panel Data 
The PollingPoint panel is a proprietary opt-in survey panel comprised of over 1.6 
million U.S. residents who have agreed to participate in YouGov/Polimetrix's Web 
surveys. At any given time, YouGov/Polimetrix maintains a minimum of five recruitment 
campaigns based on current events. Panel members are recruited by a number of methods 
and on a variety of topics to help ensure diversity in the panel population. Recruiting 
methods include Web advertising campaigns (public surveys), permission-based email 
campaigns, partner sponsored solicitations, telephone-to-Web recruitment (RDD based 
sampling), and mail-to-Web recruitment (Voter Registration Based Sampling). 
The primary method of recruitment for the PollingPoint Panel is Web advertising 
campaigns that appear based on keyword searches. In practice, a search in Google may 
prompt an active PollingPoint advertisement soliciting opinion on the search topic. At the 
conclusion of the short survey respondents are invited to join the PollingPoint panel in 
order to receive and participate in additional surveys. After a double opt-in procedure, 
where respondents must confirm their consent by responding to an email, the database 
checks to ensure the newly recruited panelist is in fact new and that the address 
information provided is valid. 
Additionally, YouGov/Polimetrix augments their panel with difficult to recruit 
respondents by soliciting panelists in telephone and mail surveys. For example, in the fall 
and winter of 2006, YouGov/Polimetrix completed telephone interviews using RDD 
sampling and invited respondents to join the online panel. Respondents provided a 
working email where they could confirm their consent and request to receive online 
survey invitations. YouGov/Polimetrix also employed registration based sampling, 
inviting respondents to complete a pre e-election survey online. At the conclusion of that 
survey, respondents were invited to become PollingPoint members and receive additional 
survey invitations at their email address. 
 
Sampling and Sample Matching 
Sample matching is a methodology for selection of “representative” samples from 
nonrandomly selected pools of respondents. Ideally suited for Web access panels, it could 
also be used for other types of surveys such as phone surveys. Sample matching begins 
by determining the target population. For general population studies, the target 
population is all American adults, and can be enumerated through the use of the 
decennial Census or another high quality survey, such as the American Community 
Survey. In other contexts, this is known as the sampling frame, though, unlike 
conventional sampling, the sample is not drawn from the frame. Traditional sampling, 
selects individuals from the sampling frame at random for participation in the study. This 
may not be feasible or economical as the contact information, especially email addresses, 
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is not available for all individuals in the frame and refusals to participate increase the 
costs of sampling in this way. 
Sample selection using the matching methodology is a two-stage process. First, a 
random sample, called the target sample, is drawn from the target population. Details on 
how the target sample is drawn are provided below, but the idea is that this sample is a 
true probability sample and thus representative of the frame from which it was drawn. 
Second, for each member of the target sample, we select one or more matching members 
from our pool of opt-in respondents. This is called the matched sample. Matching is 
accomplished using a large set of variables that are available in consumer and voter 
databases for both the target population and the opt-in panel. 
The purpose of matching is to find an available respondent who is as similar as 
possible to the selected member of the target sample, resulting in a sample of respondents 
who have the same measured characteristics as the target sample. Under the conditions 
described below, the matched sample will have similar properties to a true random 
sample, mimicking the characteristics of the target sample. It is “representative” of the 
target population (because of its similarities to the target sample). 
When choosing the matched sample, it is necessary to find the closest matching 
respondent in the panel of opt-ins to each member of the target sample. Polimetrix 
employs the proximity matching method to find the closest matching respondent. For 
each variable used for matching, we define a distance function, d(x,y), which describes 
how “close” the values x and y are on a particular attribute. The overall distance between 
a member of the target sample and a member of the panel is a weighted sum of the 
individual distance functions on each attribute. The weights can be adjusted for each 
study based upon which variables are thought to be important. For that study, though, for 
the most part, we have not found the matching procedure to be sensitive to small 
adjustments of the weights. A large weight, on the other hand, forces the algorithm 
toward an exact match on that dimension. 
 
Sampling Frame and Target Sample 
YouGov/Polimetrix constructed a sampling frame of U.S. residents from the 2006 
American Community Survey, including data on age, race, gender, education, and party 
identification. The frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the full 2006 ACS 
sample with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements (using the 
person weights on the public use file). Data on party identification was matched from the 
2004 National Annenberg Election Study. The target sample was drawn from U.S. 
residents in the sampling frame and was selected by stratification by age, race, gender, 
education, and by simple random sampling within strata. 
 
Weighting 
Because matching is approximate, rather than exact, and response rates vary by 
group, the sample of completed interviews normally shows small amounts of imbalance 
that can be corrected by post-stratification weighting. 
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Raking, first proposed by Deming and Stephan (1940), adjusts an initial set of 
weights to match a known set of population marginals, using a method of iterative 
proportional fitting (see Bishop, Fienberg and Holland, 1975 for details). In this 
procedure, the weights are adjusted sequentially to match the marginal distribution of 
each weight variable. The process proceeds until all marginals are matched. It does not 
require any information about the joint distribution of the variables. Weights were 
applied to the target sample based on age, race, gender, and education. 
 
APPENDIX B: METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
Derivation of the Extended Beta-Binomial Distribution 
 
By weakening the binomial assumption that π is constant from individual to individual, I 
allow π vary as a random variable according to the beta distribution, or πi ~ beta(ρ,γ). The 
beta distribution has π as a random variable with two parameters ρ and γ (King 1998), 
and may be written as: 
 
 fβ( πi | ρ,γ) =
 (      (   )   )
 (    )     )    
   
    (   )(   ) 
     for 0 < π < 1, and where  
  (x)= ∫     
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while the binomial distribution is written as:  
 
fb(Yi=yi | n, π) =(
 
  
)   (   )     for yi= 0,  ,…, n and 0 ≤ π ≤   
 
To derive the extended beta-binomial probability distribution, allowing π to vary 
according to the beta distribution, I must first find the joint distribution fi of the binomial 
and beta distributions: 
 
 fj(yi, π | ρ,γ) = fb(yi| π) fβ( πi | ρ,γ) 
 
The extended beta-binomial distribution is derived by collapsing the joint distribution 
over π: 
 
 febb (yi | ρ,γ)= ∫   
 
  
(      ρ,γ) dπ 
 
In the extended beta binomial distribution, ρ is the mean probability of the unobserved 
binary variables. Reparameterizing ρ as π, for yi=0, …, n, the extended beta-binomial 
distribution is defined as: 
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febb (yi| π , γ)= Pr(Yi = yi| n, π, γ)= 
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where E(Yi) = nρ and Var(Yi)= nρ(1- ρ)[1+( n-1)γ(1+γ)-1] 
 
The log-likelihood function for the extended beta-binomial distribution is: 
 
ln L(π,γ|y) =∑    
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Thus, π reparameterized as a random variable following the beta distribution is the 
average probability of an individual responding positively to an item while γ governs the 
degree to which π varies among individuals. When γ=0, the extended beta-binomial 
distribution reduces to the binomial and all the πs are constant (King 1998). Larger 
amounts of variation in π lead to larger values of γ.  
 
APPENDIX C: CALCULATING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The primary dependent variable, political participation, is an index created from 
ten participation items on the 2009 Money and Politics survey. These items asked 
whether the respondent had participated in any of the following activities over the 
previous four years: contributed to a political campaign, attended a political meeting or 
rally, participated in a demonstration or protest, discussed politics with friends and 
family, contacted elected representatives, contacted newspapers or magazine editors for 
political causes, signed a petition, voted in a primary election, volunteered for a political 
campaign, or participated in some other fashion. The plurality of those who had 
participated in some other action (N= ) acted in some kind of management or supervisory 
role on a political campaign. Each participation item was recoded into a binary score; a 
positive response to an item was coded as a 1, while a negative response was coded as 0. 
The sum of these scores indicates a respondent’s level of participation, and higher scores 
indicate higher levels of political participation. An individual with a participation score of 
0 indicates that he did not participate in any political activities, while a score of 10 means 
that he participated in all activities mentioned in the study. 
 For the ANES 2008 data, the political participation index was created from seven 
participation items found in the survey. These items asked whether one had contributed to 
a political campaign, party, or other group during the 2008 election cycle; attended a 
political rally, speech, meeting, dinner, or something of the like for a particular candidate; 
wore a campaign button or put up a yard sign or pumper sticker; discussed politics with 
friends and family; had contacted their elected official within the past 12 months; voted 
in the 2008 primary, or had done any other work for a party or candidate. While the time 
window for these participatory acts was shorter than that asked in the Money and Politics 
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survey, this should not pose too great an issue since the greatest likelihood for 
participation comes during an election year, particularly that of a presidential election.  
 
APPENDIX D: MONEY AND POLITICS SURVEY QUESTION WORDING  
 
Interest 
Generally speaking, would you say that you are extremely interested in politics and 
public affairs, somewhat interested, not very interested, or not at all interested?  
 
Corruption 
(Quid Pro Quo) 
Some argue that the main source of political corruption in the U.S. Congress results from 
campaign contributors expecting politicians vote in certain ways on legislation. How 
often do you think politicians base their votes on a legislative bill on the preferences of 
their campaign contributors rather than their constituents? Would you say this never 
happens? Sometimes happens? Often happens? Or do you think it happens all the time?  
 
Do you think corruption in the U.S. Congress is a very serious problem, somewhat 
serious, not too serious, or not a serious problem at all?  
 
Participation 
Have you contributed to any political campaigns in the last four years?  
 
Have you participated in any of the following activities over the past four years? 
Attend a political meeting or rally 
Participate in a demonstration or protest 
Discuss politics with friends and family 
Contact elected representatives 
Contact newspapers or magazines editors for political causes 
Petition 
Vote in a primary election 
Volunteer for a political campaign 
Other 
APPENDIX E: 2008 AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION SURVEY QUESTION WORDING 
 
Trust 
(Version A)  
How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do 
what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time? 
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(Version B)  
How much of the time do you think you can trust the federal government in Washington 
to make decisions in a fair way—always, most of the time, about half the time, once in a 
while, or never? 
 
Waste 
Do you think that people in government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste 
some of it, or don’t waste very much of it? 
 
Crooked 
Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked, not very 
many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked? 
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